ABSTRACT: A. Rosenberg and D. Kaplan argue that their account of the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS), as a law of physical systems (including
Introduction
According to Rosenberg and Kaplan (2005) , the metaphysical thesis of antireductionism concerning biological systems is that it is a matter of the ontological structure of the world that " [t] here are facts, kinds, and generalizations that a molecular biological approach would miss." (p. 45) Thus, the thesis exceeds mere
Physicalism and antireductionism
Physicalism has been defined in a number of ways. The two principles of physicalism that Rosenberg and Kaplan emphasize, as they have been formulated by Hellman and Thompson (1975) , are the following: first, the principle that every concrete thing is a physical thing; and second, the so-called physical determination thesis which states that every fact is fixed by physical facts. J. Kim (1993 Kim ( , 1998 Kim ( , 2005 has advocated a more refined version of physicalist principles, but one which remains compatible with those of Hellman and Thompson. More specifically, his Causal Closure Principle (CCP) states that every physical event has a physical cause (Kim 1993, 350-5) , and his Causal Inheritance Principle (CIP) argues that causal powers of any higher-level property are reducible to the causal power of a lower-level property, or a subse t of lower-level properties (Kim 1993, 355) .
Based on these two principles, Kim offers a widely-discussed general argument for physicalism that has to do with the so-called overdetermination problem. In his terms, either it is the physical basis along with the higher-level property instantiated by it, which bring about the effect, or it is only the physical basis that does so. On the one hand, the latter possibility is compatible with reductionism, and is therefore the solution studiously avoided by (ontological) antireductionists. On the other hand, the former solution, presumably the only one that antireductionists can accept, has an undesirable consequence: causes work simultaneously at the higher and at the (physical) basis level, thereby overdetermining the effect. But why is this undesirable? If we say that both properties cause the effect, this implies an abandoning of what reductionists regard as a basic principle of causal explanation: namely, that every effect has a necessary and sufficient cause (Causal Exclusion Principle) .
It is the overdetermination problem that leads Rosenberg and Kaplan (p. 46s ) to dismiss the possibility of advocating antireductionism in biology on the basis of antireductionist ontology. That is why they reject the possibility of accepting the emergence of biological laws from physical processes (p. 49s). They believe that it is ontologically much more prudent to eliminate the possibility of genuine downward causation, implied by antireductionist ontology, and to advocate the autonomy of biology while retaining the physicalist principles. This will require a different, and as I will argue, ultimately unsatisfying, account of antireductionism.
Rosenberg and Kaplan's attempt to reconcile antireductionism and physicalism
The authors begin by portraying reconciliation in very general terms. In their view, "biology relies on a theory that is not reducible to more fundamental physical theory, and on the other hand… the theory on which it relies should give no pause to the physicalist reductionist." (p. 47) Thus, "[t]he autonomy of biological theory from physics and chemistry to be established here raises no suspicions whatever of an implicit or explicit commitment to metaphysical, ontological differences from physics which reductionists suspect must lurk in a truly autonomous biology" (p. 47). In other words, it avoids the overdetermination problem that, presumably, antireductionism cannot avoid, grounded as it is on the account that advocates downward causation. It manages to do so because " [t ] he processes characteristic of biology are not the consequences of laws and initial conditions familiar from physics and chemistry." 1 More specifically, biological explanations add "adaptational causes" (and functional vocabulary) to "science's "proximate" mechanistic causes" (p. 47), so that the "[s]subject matter will rest on the irreducibility of this theory" (i.e., a theory devised by biologists) "to physical science." 2 However, this irreducibility will have to be established in a manner consistent with physicalism if it is to vindicate a defensible autonomy of biology. " (p. 48) But how can this be achieved? From the generalizations in biology, one needs to select a good candidate for the law of biology, one which may turn out to be applicable to a much wider domain than the subject of biological studies usually suggests, in fact, to a domain which includes all physical systems. In the spirit of understanding biology primarily as the science of evolution, Rosenberg and Kaplan consider the Principle of Natural Selection the prime candidate. According to them, the Principle of Natural Selection (PNS) states the following: "(x)(y)(E)[If x is fitter than y in environment E at generation n, then probably there is some future generation n', after which x has more descendants than y" (Rosenberg and Kaplan, 48) , where x, y, and E range over reproducing systems and environments. In other words, "[i]f there is phenotypic variation in hereditary traits, and these traits have differential fitness, then (probably) there is descent with modification (i.e., evolution)" (p. 48). This expression of the PNS is open to criticism and improvement, but as the formulation of the PNS does not particularly affect my argument, let us assume that the authors' formulation is uncontroversial.
Is the PNS applicable to other natural systems, the molecular ones in particular? The authors cautiously, yet convincingly argue that this may well be the case. I will assume that this claim is also uncontroversial. It may even seem uncontroversial prima facie given that clearly, the relevance of the PNS, as it is amplified in the complex molecular structures of living organisms, was more likely to draw attention of those studying such systems (i.e., biologists), than those focusing on the study of less complex molecular structures (i.e., chemists). (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, pp. 33-4) 3 Now, given that the law is applicable to different levels, the argument goes, it cannot be derived from other laws of physics and chemistry that we know of. In fact, it is a basic physical law, a law applicable to physical systems that uniquely introduces adaptional causes. In the words of Rosenberg and Kaplan (2005, 49) : "The PNS is an underived law about physical systems (including nonbiological ones)."
But is the PNS, as a law of physical systems, underivable from other familiar physical laws compatible with physicalism, and if so, why? It is important to note that it is unclear whether the PNS as a basic physical law is necessarily tied to physicalism. The authors claim that the law is "substrate-neutral" and as such may be applicable to both entities of the physicalist world, and presumably to those postulated by nonreductive ontology as well. Let us begin by examining the former possibility -advocated by Rosenberg and Kaplan as being more desirable. 4 Here, the authors state, quite correctly, that the applicability of the PNS to the lower-level entities (molecules and possibly atoms) in the physicalist world "requires that at any given level of the organization of the matter, all the way from the lipid bi-layer to the group of interacting organisms, the operation of the PNS is grounded (in part) on its operation at one or more lower levels of organization of matter, and always on its operation at the level of the molecule" (p. 62). Put otherwise, the physicalists' The initial experiments with the replication of RNA did not qualify as cases of full-blown selection due to the lack of enzymes that provide a necessary extent of variability in molecules: as it turned out, the RNA molecules themselves can play the role of enzymes.
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The answer to the question of whether or not the PNS as an underived law is compatible with both physicalism and antireductionist ontology (whatever our account of it may be), or only with the former, is not crucial here, as my main point will be that the PNS as an underived basic physical law plus physicalism yield only a very limited autonomy of biology.
claim that the operation of a law L at a higher-level must be grounded on L's operation at the lower (molecular or atomic) level accommodates the determination thesis (or the CIP principle, in Kim's definition of physicalism): the causal power of every supervenient property (a subject of L), for example, the properties concerning populations, is determined by, and reducible to, that of the lower-level (a primary subject of L), for example, properties concerning molecules. In the physicalist world, L, such as the PNS, is a physical law primarily because it is operational at the lower (molecular) level. This leads the authors to comment: "We may apply this approach to elucidate how the physical facts can fix all the facts," in what is otherwise a v acuous requirement of physicalism, "including the appearance of 'downward causation,' in biology, and multi-level selection, without incurring the obligation to embrace ontological antireductionism" (p. 62). Although the PNS is operational at the levels higher than the molecular, this is only because "at each level of chemical aggregation, … instantiation of another PNS, grounded in (or at least derivable from) the molecular interactions that follow the PNS in the environment, operating at one or more lower levels of aggregation." (Rosenberg and Kaplan, p. 60) 
Why Rosenberg and Kaplan's attempt fails
Thus, if the PNS as a basic physical law is wedded to physicalism, then it is a law because it is a physical law. And it is a physical law because it is operational at the lower-level systems (molecules), while at other levels, its operation is determined by this basic one. There is no basic law of nature, which is not applicable across the physical world. And a law of nature is either a basic physical law, or a law derived from basic physical laws.
But what kind of autonomy of biology is achieved if at least some biological laws turn out to be basic physical laws in Rosenberg and Kaplan's sense? With respect to the implications of the PNS as a basic physical law plus physicalism, Rosenberg and Kaplan say that "[a]s the exponents of biology's descriptive and explanatory autonomy have held, the functional-kind vocabulary of biology will be irreducible to that of physical science" (p. 67). True, but the writers' reason for this throws out the baby with the bath water, when they continue: "However, the reason will simply be that the PNS for molecules, whose action 'builds' the functional kinds as adaptations, is not reducible to the (other) laws of physics" (p. 67).
"PNS for molecules" is a key phrase here: in the physicalist world, it is the PNS for molecules that builds the functional kinds as adaptations at other levels, and thus grounds the law. Accordingly, and this is the key point, the ultimate ground for the recognition of the PNS as a basic law is established by means of the evidence of its operation at the molecular level. This implies that a biological generalization has an explanatory power ultimately only by virtue of its being a physical law, by virtue of it being confirmable by the studies of the entities at the levels lower than those traditionally studied by biologists (those of individuals, groups, populations, etc.). Thus, if physicalism is true, in order to be established as laws of nature, biological generalizations must be discovered to be operational at the lower (molecular) levels. Otherwise, there is a danger that they may turn out to be 'just so stories' as we will have no way of know ing whether or not they represent merely convenient generalizations that help us intellectually cope with the subject-matter.
The inter-theoretic irreducibility to which the authors refer concerns the theory grounded at the molecular level, which, in turn, determines the grounding at the higher levels. This may provide a theoretical autonomy of molecular biology (and the law of natural selection as its defining law) from other basic theories of molecular systems. But the main problem with this view is that this kind of autonomy can be reconciled only with a very narrow and (at least for the practice, history, and ontology of biology) rather inadequate concept of anti-reductionism. Thus, only if one believes there is good reason to understand biology as, in effect, reducible to molecular biology, can one be satisfied with this rather limited sense of (intertheoretic) anti-reductionism and its reconciliation with the autonomy of biology as one of the physical sciences concerned with molecular systems.
What about the usual biological generalizations, and then principles that they generate, concerning cells, microorganisms, individuals, populations and species, prior to the testing at the molecular level? If we follow the authors' line of reasoning, unless they receive the stamp of approval through the study of molecules, they should not be treated as explanations that capture genuine properties of natural systems. If biological generalizations have any explanatory merit, they do so by virtue of being discoverable at the molecular level. And this is why, even if they finally get a stamp of approval, the applicability of the law at the higher levels that they reflect will remain a type of shorthand; the generalizations avoid reduction only because of our "ignorance of all the gory details." Granted, they represent indispensable shorthand, but only due to the exquisite complexity of the subjectmatter, shorthand that talks about adaptations of indivi duals and populations, instead of molecular adaptations. And this is what makes "epistemic antireductionism inevitable" (p. 64). But they are still shorthand that lacks sufficient ground for autonomously legitimate explanations. The evolutionary theory concerning cells, metabolic systems of individuals, the behavior of individuals, populations, and species, and so on, is recognized as explanatory, if at all, by virtue of it being operational at the molecular level alone. Even if we take seriously into consideration generalizations arrived at higher-levels, there will be nevertheless a kind of a two-tier criterion for determining the laws of biology, where only operational ability of a generalization at one of the tiers alone (namely those representing molecular level) will guarantee it the status of a biological (physical) law. As the usage of the predicates of the theory cannot be legitimized on the grounds of their being first and foremost applicable at these higher-level biological instances, Rosenberg and Kaplan offer biology only a meager vindication. The practice and the history of biology require us to devise a broader and more realistic understanding of biology's autonomy and anti-reductionism, an understanding which can capture biological regularities, as well as the generalizations and principles that generate them.
This account has serious implications in terms of the heuristics: if one embraces the authors' thesis, then biology should be guided primarily by the physical/ chemical confirmations, rather than by the logic of discovery stemming from its internally developed principles unconfirmed on the lower levels. But this is at odds with the nature and history of evolutionary theory, which only secondarily could be (arguably) successfully applicable to the molecular level.
The authors go on to emphasize what they believe are the advantages of the PNS as an underived law in compliance with physicalism, as opposed to ontological antireductionism (and the possible compatibility of the PNS with it). They argue that one advantage is that " [w] hat the PNS will not permit is long-term fitness changes at the level of groups without long-terms fitness changes in the same direction among some or all of the individuals composing them" (p. 65). Presumably, then, the ontological antireductionist may claim that there can be changes at the higher levels, which are neutral to the changes at the level of individuals and thereby at the molecular level. It is fine to claim, as does physicalism, that this possibility is worth avoiding. But the PNS, plus non-reductionist ontology may avoid it as well. In fact, Rosenberg and Kaplan overlook the possibility that an assumption that may be shared by physicalist and antireductionist ontology is their c ommitment to the existence of correlations between higher-level and lower-level changes. The principle of ontological antireductionism that makes it incompatible with physicalism is that the changes at the higher level determine the changes among individuals rather than vice-versa (Healey, Silberstein, Humphreys) . 5 The principles of reductive physicalism are challenged here: CEP becomes merely an operational principle, and the causal structure of interacting ontological levels cannot be captured in terms of the CIP. 6 The causal account of selection may require proximate and ultimate causes, as selection is a population phenomenon. For example, sexual selection causes modifications of the share of traits in populations, not of individual traits, and tracing back the modifications of a trait from ancestor to ancestor does not provide insight into selection. The ultimate cause responsible for selection, thus, is instantiated at the level of population, and as such it determines the outcome at the level of individuals (changed directly by proximate causes) by selecting them. (Sober, Lewontin, Wouters) M oreover, an anti-reductionist ontology that disposes of the CEP and CIP is indispensable in capturing metabolic processes, not only evolutionary processes, as the experimental work on the issue suggests (Boogerd et al.) . Certain systemic properties of metabolic 5 In other words, both anti-reductionism and physicalism subscribe to global supervenience. Local supervenience, however, no matter how indispensable it may be in grounding down-top determination (Kim 1996, 140) , breaks down in the case of downward causation, as the higherlevel property instances determine the activities of the lower-level property instances, at the same time retaining the correlation between the levels. systems, captured by nonlinear functions, are observed to arise only in the context of the cell but are not exhibited by subsystems in isolation. They, moreover, determine behavior of subsystems as a genuine property, independently from those instantiatable in isolated subsystems.
Similarly, the authors' claim that "the substrate-neutral PNS can operate at various levels of organization, moving in different and indeed opposite directions within larger biological systems and the smaller ones they contain" does not exclusively support reductionist ontology. Only if a further condition is added, namely, that the operating of the PNS at multiple levels is "owing to its operation at the level of molecules" (p. 65), does their claim accord with reductionism and physicalism. Even so, the multilevel potency of the substrata enabled by the PNS as a general law, does not necessarily comply with the reductionist principle of determination (or the CIP), given that the properties of entities at higher levels may determine the properties of entities at lower levels.
If we embrace Rosenberg and Kaplan's view, given the underivability of the PNS (and possibly other laws discovered by biologists), the extent of the autonomy of biology should be granted on the basis of its being on par with other physical sciences that generate basic physical laws. But the authors seem reluctant to grant even this much. Given their claim that the PNS's applicability to the molecular and lower levels are critical for establishing its status as a basic law of physical systems, it may actually require more substantial criteria of confirmation than do any generalizations concerning macro-physical phenomena in physics. Physicists, regardless of their knowledge of the possible applicability to lower-level substrata, typically take these seriously. However, what may seem harsh criteria for judging biological generalizations, may be the consequence of (reductionist) physicalist presuppositions in understanding the procedures that establish the validity of laws in physics in the first place. Thus, Rosenberg and Kaplan suggest that although physics has not provided a completely succe ssful grounding for the second law of thermodynamics, "few physicists have any doubt that the principle is a derived and not basic one" (p. 54).
But creating an analogy between the PNS as applicable to different levels of natural systems, and the relation between statistical thermodynamics and Newtonian mechanics, does not necessarily work to the reductionist advantage. Even if it is true that "few physicists have any doubt" about the reduction of the second law of thermodynamics to Newtonian mechanics, is their lack of doubt substantiated by anything more than the leap of faith that such a reduction must be available in principle? Furthermore, physicists have become wary of placing bets on cases of possible reductions, in the face of discoveries in quantum mechanics and the increasing relevance of nonlinear dynamics in explaining both macro-physical phenomena and their relations with the micro-physical world (Kronz, Rueger and Sharp, Ott) . And those who are willing to bet on what is, according to the authors, an unlikely winner in the race, namely the lack of reduction in the case of the second la w of thermodynamics, or in other words, the second law as the basic underived law on nature, seem to have as strong a case as those betting on the authors' favorite. (Nicolis and Prigogine, Grad) Did Rosenberg and Kaplan choose the PNS as a candidate generalization only because of their commitment to biology as primarily the science of evolution? This may well be the case. It also seems likely that they chose it because there is good evidence that this is a law whose operation is discoverable at the molecular level. Would they attempt to make the same argument if it were not? I, for one, do not think so. But even if that were the case, would evolutionary biology be a 'just so' story, ungrounded at the "basic level" of the physical world? The unequivocal answer is, yes, it would be, if we were to stick with two principles of physicalism.
What, then, guarantees substantial autonomy of biology? And is the possibility of biological law as a law concerning physical systems relevant? A substantial antireductionism must concern causal powers of biological systems at multiple levels, not only inter-theoretic irreducibility at the molecular level. In my opinion, a positive answer to the following question would guarantee a satisfying autonomy of biology: could there be biological laws, which are confirmable at levels higher than the molecular, in that their operation is primarily grounded on these levels, and only indirectly at the lower levels, including the molecular? If the answer is yes, then the operation of such laws at the molecular level is accountable for in terms of the properties that are generated in molecular systems as such, which are not exhibited in isolated molecules. Such collective properties are the constituents of the higherlevel entities, the entities studied by biologists. The properties of these entities are physical in a broad sense 7 , in that they concern natural systems, but the nature of such natural systems is such that looking at the molecular mechanisms only, as molecular biology does, may not produce sufficient explanations of the law's operation. These laws may apply primarily to metabolic, developmental and morphogenetic processes. (Boogerd, et al.) But even in the case of the PNS, the question of what exactly is selected, whether primarily a single molecule, and molecular aggregates and other higher-level instances only in a derived sense, or say, a metabolic system of a microorganism, whose structural properties (such as spatial configuration) may not be even in principle attributable to the isolated molecules of the system should be decided on empirical grounds. 8 (Perovic 2007 ) As some insightful experimental work suggests (Boogerd et al.) , the causal power of the metabolic system defined by these collective properties may determine the operation of the molecular unit, rather than vice versa. But then again, it may not.
Regardless, a possible underivability of the laws is neutral to the question of the autonomy of biology, precisely because of its substrate-neutrality. It is important to realize that the PNS may be applicable to different levels of the ontological ladder in a number of ways, and the entities and the properties they instantiate at different levels may be determined in a number of ways, which may be captured by Although a proper label for the antireductionist ontology advocated here would be "nonreductive physicalism," I talk of antireductionist ontology in order to avoid possible confusion, as by "physicalism," many philosophers mean "reductive physicalism," assuming that the overdetermination problem is insurmountable for antireductionists. incompatible ontological accounts. This is why biological programs should not be centered on confirmations at the molecular levels; they may not be available, even in principle, in the form that the reductionist expects them to be available. It is also worth noting that although ontological antireductionists are committed to downward causation, an alternative may be to understand the organism in more integrative terms, and devise a causal account that would bypass the dichotomy between levels, which is a residue of the traditional account of (Humean) causation, which lies at the foundations of physicalism.
Slobodan Perović
Zašto je pogrešan Rozenbergov i Kaplanov pokušaj pomirenja fizikalizma i antiredukcionizma u biologiji (Apstrakt) A. Rozenberg i D. Kaplan tvrde da njihov princip prirodne selekcije (PPS), kao zakon primenljiv na fizičke sisteme u širem smislu (uključujući one kojima se bavi biologija) i neizvodiv iz poznatih fizičkih zakona, omogućava vrstu eksplanatorne autonomije za kojom tragaju antiredukcionisti, a koja ne narušava principe redukcionističkog fizikalizma. Međutim, moguće je da je PPS neutralan u odnosu na eksplanatornu autonomiju biologije. Zapravo, u kombinaciji sa redukcionističkim fizikalizmom (što je mogućnost koju autori razmatraju), PPS implicira samo vrlo ograničenu autonomiju biologije, značajnu koliko i kvazi-autonomija koju biologiji generalno pripisuju redukcionisti. U svetu kakvom ga vide fizikalisti, PPS je operativan i samim tim može da bude otkriven na višim ontološkim nivoima (onima koje karakterišu biološke ćelije, individue, populacije i vrste), samo zato što je operabilnost zakona koji se tiču sistema na tim višim nivoima zasnovana na operabilnosti istih na nižim nivoima (tj. nivoima atoma i molekula). Iz toga sledi, u vezi eksplanatornog kriterijuma, da bilo koja generalizacija, otkrivena od strane biologa, može da bude uspostavljena kao zakon samo ako je njen status potvrđen njenom primenljivošću na molekularnim i drugim sistemima kojima se bave hemija i biologija; u suprotnom, ona bi bila samo "prazna priča" o biološkim sistemima. Usko razumevanje autora, kako antiredukcionizma tako i bioloških zakona navodno svodljivih na zakone koji se tiču molekula, rezultira u iluziji uspostavljanja eksplanatorne autonomije: tako, u slučaju PPS-a, sledi da iako su biolozi bili prvi koji su igrom slučaja primenili taj princip, njihova istraživanja ćelija, individua, populacija i vrsta ne bi mogla da uspostave PPS kao zakon. Rezultat argumenta pomenutih autora je, u najboljem slučaju, odsustvo inter-teorijske redukcije molekularne biologije, zbog toga što ta disciplina u stvari pripada fizici. Supstancijalna
